T he Secretary of State for Trade and Industry,
Stephen Byers, recently gave a speech at the TUC/IPPR Seminar on Corporate Governance. In it, he referred to the ongoing Company Law Review, and stressed the importance of reshaping company law in order that it may reflect the needs of the modern economy and provide a clear framework within which companies may operate. On the subject of directors' duties, Mr Byers recognised that companies today do not operate in a vacuum. Indeed, the way companies are run affects a whole range of interests beyond those of the immediate shareholders, including customers, creditors, the
environment and the wider community. He pointed out that companies need to be flexible so that they may consider the wider interests of the company alongside those of their investors, and not merely focus on shortterm profits, as they currently do: 
THE ROLE OF DISCLOSURE
This idea of the 'stakeholder' and its involvement in the company/society is a familiar theme of this government, having featured in its pre-election literature and been pursued since in various policy areas. But given the content of the speech, how can we ensure that directors take their wider responsibilities seriously? In an apparent shift in policy emphasis away from their pre-election position, further recognition of the corporate stakeholder did not gain favour with Mr Byers. Instead, he indicated that the way forward was to look at disclosure of relevant issues by companies. He thought disclosure would need to cover important issues such as 'relations with suppliers, customer complaints, employment policies, corporate governance, environmental, social and ethical policies where these are material to the business.' He further stressed the importance of 'quality rather than quantity of information so that shareholders, customers and other stakeholders can make informed decisions.' Indeed, Mr Byers made a valid point about the stakeholder approach, in that it will be difficult for directors to take into account all interests (if such a duty is indeed imposed), as there will always be conflicts of interests which may be difficult, if not impossible, to resolve.
At first sight, it is difficult to disagree with Mr Byers. Disclosure is a just and fair obligation for companies to shoulder. If their activities affect the livelihood of consumers, employees and suppliers as well as the environment, then these affected parties or their representatives should be able to enquire into company affairs where it affects them, in order that they can make decisions about their affairs and dealings with the o company. In conjunction with this, they should also be able to represent their interests before the company in order to influence the way the company makes decisions where it concerns them. Despite the much-heralded reality of globalisation, it is still very much the fact that many communities are tied directly to the economic good fortune (or otherwise) of a few large companies in their locality who provide direct and indirect employment as well as funding the social infrastructure. This article will look at how third parties can currently obtain information about the way companies are run by directors and ask if this is adequate. We will also question if this flow of information from directors to affected/interested parties can be improved. If information is the key to proper corporate governance, then the law must ensure that these parties can gain access to information they need without undue hindrance.
DISCLOSURE TO NON-EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS
The last decade has seen the rise of the non-executive director as monitor of company activities. In simple terms, the non-executive director can be identified as an individual who serves on the board of directors of a public limited company but does not work for that business enterprise on a full-time basis. Corporate governance literature ascribes to the non-executive (as distinct from the full-time executive director) a pivotal role in reforming the practices, standards and performance of the board of directors within UK companies. The effectiveness of that role depends on the quality of information received by those individuals. They usually come into these positions having substantial experience of the sector: as board members they should receive all board papers for the meetings they attend as well as both formal and informal briefings from their colleagues.
However such disclosure is neither guaranteed nor fully effective. There is no means of vetting the consistency of supply and quality of information passed to the nonexecutives. There may or may not be provision for the non-executive to have access to outside paid advice. Furthermore the utility of the information provided may be negated by the contractual arrangements with the company. If the non-executive's contract provides for a fixed number of hours per year, will this give the individual enough time to get to grips with the issues underpinning the company's strategy and policy so as to give advice that is timely, relevant and of value? If non-executives are to be effective as 'independent' monitors and indeed act as links between shareholders and the board, the informational aspects of their roles need to be addressed, if necessary, by regulation.
DISCLOSURE TO SHAREHOLDERS
Shareholders are a strange breed of people in the UK. They invest in their companies mainly for financial gain. There is little loyalty to the company on the part of the majority of shareholders. On the contrary, they often sell up and leave the company in the event that they are unhappy with the performance of the company. They also seldom involve themselves in the decision-making process of the company, but are happy to leave the management of the company in the hands of their directors. This attitude, although very slowly changing with regard to institutional shareholders, is still true of private individual shareholders. What about the use of general meetings as a forum for disclosure? The general meeting is billed as an important event where management gives an account to shareholders o o of how they have run the company. Directors can be placed under the spotlight and can be asked to explain certain policy decisions, justify controversial measures and generally be available to provide/disclose information about the company to interested shareholders. The reality however, is somewhat different, and several flaws can be detected in our current system.
For one, before convening the meeting, directors are required by law to send certain information to all shareholders entitled to attend and vote (Companies Act 1985 s. 370(2)). Shareholders must be sent a notice convening the meeting, as well as other relevant information such as reports, accounts and a summary of resolutions to be passed at the general meeting. The information sent is very brief indeed. The law does not require that full information be made available to 19
shareholders, although certain resolutions may need to be set out in full. The more diligent shareholder, who may want to view any texts in their entirety, such as proposed changes to articles, will have to visit the registered office of the company. In addition, current practice only dictates that relevant documents (such as articles) be made available for inspection 15 minutes before the meeting (Stock Exchange Rules). This hardly leaves any time for detailed consideration, and the situation is exacerbated if other shareholders also want to inspect the same documents, or where the documents contain controversial matter. The shareholder may of course then choose to question the directors directly on a specific matter at the meeting, but even then, under the law, he is not entitled to an answer. Indeed, if the item which he wishes to consider is not on the agenda, there is no obligation on the chairman to allow any questions on it. Not only is all this frustrating for the diligent shareholder, it also detracts from the principles of transparency and disclosure.
"INFORMATION IS THE KEY
If information is the key to proper corporate governance, then the law must ensure that these parties s can gain access to information they need without undue hindrance.
It is important to point out however, that the law does impose a duty on directors to disclose certain information about the company elsewhere. Indeed, there are different levels of disclosure. Some kinds of information about the company are available to the general public at Companies House where anyone can obtain information regarding the incorporation of the company, the allotment of shares, registration of charges, annual accounts etc. 
DISCLOSURE TO STAKEHOLDERS
General meetings are viewed as a closed affair, an encounter between shareholders and their directors (art. 38, Table A ). Other interested parties may wish to attend and participate in the general meeting, or question directors on controversial decisions. They may not do so. These parties may be employees, consumers, creditors, suppliers and representatives of the local community whose lives the activities of the company affect on a daily basis. They may have valid points to raise, matters to clarify or questions to ask of the directors. Their inability to do any of this at meetings is a great disadvantage. Of course, some of these stakeholders may prefer to meet personally with directors, or write to the company to obtain information which concerns them. Even so, given that the current duty on directors is to their company alone, they are not obliged to meet with stakeholders to discuss company affairs. Neither are they bound to provide any information requested. If these stakeholders are to be able to make informed decisions about the company and their relationship with it, then it is obvious that current practice must change.
Another interesting point to note is that employee participation at general meetings is an alien concept in the UK. Unless employees also hold shares in the company, they may not attend general meetings. Even if they do hold shares, they will, under the law, be deemed to attend these meetings as shareholders. Their rights and interests as employees take a back seat. It may, therefore, be the case that they are unable to question directors or obtain information from directors about company policy with regard to their rights as employees. Can employees obtain information from directors in other ways? In preparing the annual report directors are under an obligation to prepare a report for each financial year stating what action had been taken during the year to provide employees with information on matters concerning them, and what
consultation with them or their representatives has occurred so that their views can be taken into account in decision making (s. 234 Companies Act 1985, Schedule 7 Part V). Pt V only applies to companies with 250 employees or more). It is not stated to what extent information is to be provided to employees or their representatives, or the level to which they must actually be consulted. Companies may therefore choose to give this provision their own interpretation and effectively insert what they like in the relevant section.
Pressure groups also find it difficult to obtain information about the company. To be sure, many companies adopt ethical policies to protect the environment, ensure fair wages for third world labourers, boycott third world producers who exploit child labour or pledge support for various charities. However, the relationship between companies and pressure groups is an uneasy one. If all is well, and the support for a particular cause is in favour of the company (such as raising its profile in the market), it may co-operate with pressure groups and form long term relationships with them. However, if the company itself is accused of engaging in unethical or bad practice, it may be very difficult indeed for pressure groups to obtain any relevant information confirming this or any other fact. Acquiring a shareholding in the company will usually entitle the individuals to attend the AGM to put questions to whoever agrees to answer them. However, as discussed earlier in this article, the utility of the closely scripted, well-managed AGM to the small shareholder is negligible. Indeed there is no obligation for companies to divulge information specifically to pressure groups. Information is certainly the key to exposing acts of a J J I O particular company but without proper means of access to such information it is difficult to compel change or promote good practice on the part of companies.
How can the flow of information be improved?
If Last but not least, selected interested groups could be allowed to participate in the decision making process of the company. In the Netherlands for example, there are specific provisions in the law for employee participation in the affairs df the company via works councils. Every company with 35 or more employees must have a works council which is entitled to information about the affairs of the company and must be consulted on every matter affecting the employees. Important issues such as termination of employment of a large number of employees, or a radical change in working conditions, must first be approved by the works council. Incorporating such features into UK company law might just encourage a practice of openness and transparency as the process of liaising and consultation with these groups will compel directors to furnish various kinds of relevant information.
CONCLUSION
There will indeed be much debate about what disclosure should mean, who should regulate it and how much disclosure by the company should be compulsory. However if companies are seen to be transparent in their dealings, and not shy to disclose matters when asked to, then benefits will accrue to that company in relation to shareholder value as well as in maximising stakeholder input. It is undoubtedly necessary that the Company Law Review continues to facilitate the change from a closed to more open UK corporate culture. It is to be hoped that the present government encourages and nurtures this change within its forthcoming reforms. 
